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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the widely publicized "war" on drugs was declared in the
early 1980s, one of the most controversial weapons employed by the
government has been the device known as civil forfeiture. Both federal
and state statutes allow prosecutors to bring actions in rem against prop-
erty allegedly used in the furtherance of drug or other crimes.' For
many years, boats, cars, and even homes were seized by the government
on the theory that the property itself was somehow guilty of participat-
ing in criminal activity. The benefit of such seizures, as far as the gov-
ernment was concerned, was that the burden shifted to the property
owner to come into court to prove that the property was either not used
in the furtherance of any crime or that the owner did not know of the
property's illegal use.'
At first, and for many years, the courts were willing to allow civil
forfeiture proponents some room to work around the constitutional
1. Tamara R. Piety, Note, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine
Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 911, 916 (1991).
2. Id. at 913 n.15.
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claims of the property owners. This willingness was based, in part, on
policy concerns in favor of aiding the fight against drugs. As the anec-
dotes of abuses of civil forfeiture mounted, however, the policy concerns
began to swing in the other direction. One such policy concern that the
courts have given increasing weight is the sanctity of the right of prop-
erty, especially as it pertains to a person's home.
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Florida, in the case of Butterworth v.
Caggiano,4 held that the homestead exemption written into the Florida
Constitution as Article X, Section 4, protects homestead property from
state civil and criminal forfeiture laws. The court based its holding on
its interpretation of the homestead exemption and what it called "the
constitutional sanctity of the home."5 Florida is one of several states
recently interpreting its homestead exemption to forbid civil forfeiture. 6
In Florida, at least, it appears that homestead property is safe from civil
forfeiture.
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that in cases of civil
forfeiture of real property under federal law the Due Process clause of
the Fifth Amendment mandates that the property owner must be given
notice of the preseizure hearing and an opportunity to be heard.7 This
decision was predicated in large part on the concern over the fundamen-
tal right of property and that right's heightened due process
considerations.
Also in 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that the Exces-
sive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to forfeitures under
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).8 This holding was based on the
Court's finding that forfeiture must be construed, at least in some cases,
as punishment, and thus is limited by the Eighth Amendment. 9 Austin
reflects a realistic view of the nature of civil forfeiture actions, as
opposed to the traditional fictions underlying such actions. 10
This Comment will explore the extent to which both Florida state
civil forfeiture actions and federal civil forfeiture actions are and should
be increasingly limited by the courts based on Constitutional and policy
concerns regarding the sanctity of one's property rights in his home.
Section II of this Comment will briefly examine the history of the use of
both civil forfeiture as a weapon against crime and homestead exemp-
3. See id. at 926.
4. 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
5. Id. at 61.
6. See infra part IV.A-B.
7. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
8. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2803 (1993).
9. Id. at 2812.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 11-16.
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tions to forced judicial sale orders. This will help place these two con-
cepts in the context of their original purposes and current uses. Section
III will then examine the recent holdings of Caggiano, James Daniel
Good Real Property, and Austin. An attempt will be made to place these
decisions within the larger context of increasing court disgust with the
use of civil forfeiture. Section IV will examine how these decisions are
affecting the courts as they attempt to deal with civil forfeiture. Finally,
Section V will offer an argument to combine these holdings into a
strengthened defense against civil forfeiture actions. This argument will
be based on the strong policy considerations present in the sacred right
of property as it pertains to the home and on increasing distrust of civil
forfeiture as a weapon against crime.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND CURRENT USES OF CIVIL FORFEITURE AND
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS
A. Civil Forfeiture
The history of civil forfeiture is long and ignominious. Key to the
practice is an ancient legal fiction' 1-that property can itself be guilty
and subject to government retribution. In her article, Scorched Earth:
How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due
Process,12 Tamara Piety tracked the "demon" of civil forfeiture "to its
original contextual 'lair.' ",13 She described the personification fiction as
both cumbersome and humorous. 4 The fiction, by viewing property as
a guilty person, enables the government to seize the offending property
in order to cleanse it of its evil nature, and then convey the property to a
new owner, reaping the proceeds for the government's treasury.' 5
The fiction is a useful way for the government to shift the focus
away from the property owner, in an attempt to circumvent the normal
protections attaching to a person but not to property. Because the res is
11. Piety, supra note 1, at 918-19.
12. Piety, supra note 1.
13. Id. at 927 (quoting Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox." Some Historical Perspectives on
Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q.
169, 258 (1973)). Her historical examination of the subject of civil forfeiture is quite complete
and readers interested in a more in-depth treatment of that subject are encouraged to look to her
article. Because this Comment will concentrate on the recent trends in civil forfeiture practice and
the increasing use of the homestead exemption defense, a thorough exploration of the history of
civil forfeiture is not provided.
14. Id. at 916 n.22.
15. Id. at 917 n.31. The Department of Justice created the National Assets Seizure and
Forfeiture Fund in 1985. Since that time, yearly drug-forfeiture proceeds have grown from $27
million to almost $500 million in 1990, with over a billion dollars worth of seized property
awaiting forfeiture. Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83
J. OF CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 274-75 (1992).
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the offending party, the government need not prove that the property
owner has committed any violation of the law. 6 Furthermore, because
the res is not a person under the Constitution, many of the sacred Consti-
tutional safeguards on which the American system of justice is based are
not applicable. 17 If this were not the result of a transparent fiction, it
might not seem quite so repugnant.
Looking through this device to the government's real purpose, civil
forfeiture can only be viewed as a scam on the property owner, the gov-
ernment's real target. The true purpose of civil forfeiture is undoubtably
crime deterrence and punishment. 8 Congress intended to allow prose-
cutors to fight racketeering and drug trafficking by "attack[ing] .. .the
economic aspects of these crimes."' 9
The two statutes under which most civil forfeiture actions against
real property are undertaken are 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988)20 and 18
U.S.C. § 1955 (1988).21 The seizure statutes provide the property owner
with few of the procedural safeguards at the heart of the traditional crim-
inal justice system.2 2 To seize allegedly offending property:
the government need only show probable cause to believe that the
property was used for a specified illegal purpose. Probable cause to
forfeit requires only a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt[,] sup-
ported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion"
that the property is subject to forfeiture. 23
To meet its burden, the government may rely on circumstantial evi-
dence or facts learned after the seizure.24 Once the property has been
seized, it is then the property owner's burden to come into court to
defend his property, and therefore himself, against the government's
16. Piety, supra note 1, at 916.
17. See id. at 921-24.
18. Id. at 920.
19. S. REp. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1982), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3374.
20. Section 881(a)(7) reads:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment ....
21. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1495 (11 th Cir. 1994).
22. Stahl, supra note 15, at 278.
23. United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (alteration
in original), quoted in Stahl, supra note 15, at 285.
24. Stahl, supra note 15, at 285-86.
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case.25 The property owner must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence either that the property was not used in the furtherance of any
crime or that he was an "innocent owner."26 There is thus a great temp-
tation for the government to bring an action for civil forfeiture even in
borderline cases, because the property owner faces the almost impossi-
ble task of proving a negative-that he did not know about the illegal
use of the property.27
The history of civil forfeiture has not been pretty. Over the last
fourteen years, the period of the so-called drug war, a genuine hysteria
has prompted the government to use civil forfeiture in a manner that
would make even a proponent of firm crime control tactics think twice.
The record of questionable uses, if not outright abuse, is simply too
extensive. Consider the words of Joseph A. Eustace, Jr.:
As an experienced federal criminal practitioner, I have seen pre-
indictment and conviction seizures of homesteads with only slight
connections to criminal activity, and seen the threat of homestead
forfeiture used as a bargaining chip with defendants and witnesses
alike. Such practices are occurring in an ever-expanding number of
prosecutions.28
One must question whether the valid policy goals of fighting drugs and
organized crime are worth compromising the values expressed in the
Bill of Rights.29
B. Homestead Exemptions
Homestead exemptions have a long history in America from the
English common law to a statute passed by the Republic of Texas in
1839.30 Today, virtually every state has adopted its own version of the
homestead exemption. 31  Such exemptions are designed primarily to
25. This procedural burden was the sorry state of affairs for all civil forfeiture actions prior to
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993), which at least in
forfeiture actions against real property requires the government to provide a preseizure hearing at
which the property owner can argue against the seizure order before the property is be seized. See
infra part HI.B.
26. Stahl, supra note 15, at 286-87.
27. Piety, supra note 1, at 914 n.16. The property owner's burden is somewhat lessened by
the recent case of United States v. 6960 Miraflores Avenue in which the Eleventh Circuit held that
the property owner should prevail if there is a showing of his lack of actual knowledge of the
property's taint, reversing the district court which allowed the government to prevail on the theory
that the owner should have known of the taint. 995 F.2d 1558, 1564-65 (11th Cir. 1993).
28. Joseph A. Eustace, Jr., The Purist View Prevails: Butterworth v. Caggiano Prohibits
Homestead Forfeiture, 22 StETsoN L. REv. 1111, 1131 (1993).
29. Piety, supra note 1, at 977.
30. George L. Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HAgv. L. Rev. 1289, 1289 (1950).
31. Carolyn S. Bratt, Family Protection Under Kentucky's Inheritance Laws: Is the Family
Really Protected?, 76 Ky. L.J. 387, 391 (1988).
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protect the security of home ownership as well as the security of the
home owner and his family.32 These exemptions undeniably single out
home ownership for special consideration. Indeed, most such exemp-
tions protect homes directly and do not merely exempt a certain dollar
amount of property from creditors' claims.33 Further, the homestead
exemption is available to all homeowners and is not limited by policy
concerns regarding the particular financial condition of the person
claiming protection.34 Clearly, homestead exemptions reflect a unique
concern with the sanctity of one's home.
Florida's homestead exemption is quite generous. First created in
1868, it was enacted into the Florida Constitution in 1968.35 In its pres-
ent form, Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution reads:
(a) There shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any
court, and no judgment, decree or execution shall be a lien thereof,
except for the payment of taxes and assessments thereon, obligations
contracted for the purchase, improvement or repair thereon, or obli-
gations contracted for house, field or other labor performed on the
realty, the following property owned by a natural person:
(1) a homestead, if located outside a municipality, to the extent
of one hundred sixty acres of contiguous land and improvements
thereon, which shall not be reduced without the owner's consent
by reason of subsequent inclusion in a municipality; or if located
within a municipality, to the extent of one-half acre of contigu-
ous land, upon which the exemption shall be limited to the resi-
dence of the owner or his family ....
A 1985 amendment to the provision expanded the class of those able to
claim the protection, changing the language so that the exemption would
be available, not just to the "head of a family" but to any "natural per-
son." 36 This amendment focuses the purposes of the exemption on the
home owner's property right itself, and away from concerns centering
only around protecting families. Though humanitarian concerns for the
family remain in the cases applying the exemption,37 the amendment
must be understood as emphasizing the broader purpose of protecting
the home qua home from forced judicial sale.
Given the state and federal governments' zealous use of civil forfei-
ture and the strong individual interest in the sanctity of the home, the
stage was set for a showdown.
32. Id. at 391; Haskins, supra note 30, at 1289, 1290.
33. Bratt, supra note 31, at 391.
34. Id. at 392.
35. Stephen H. Price, Note, Florida's Homestead Exemption: Racketeers Should Not Leave
Home Without It, 21 STETsoN L. REv. 681, 683 (1992).
36. Id. at 684.
37. See id.
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III. CGGIANO, JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL PROPERTY, and A USTIN
A. Butterworth v. Caggiano38
In 1992, the Florida Supreme Court settled a conflict among the
Florida district courts of appeal and decided that Florida's homestead
exemption prohibited state civil or criminal forfeiture of homestead
property.39 This section will examine this decision and the case law
upon which it was based.
In 1986, Louis A. Caggiano was convicted of one count of racke-
teering in violation of the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act ("Florida RICO Act"),4° and fifteen counts of book-
making.41 Three of the bookmaking counts were found to have taken
place at Caggiano's residence. 42 Accordingly, the State later began for-
feiture proceedings under the Florida RICO Act43 on the grounds that
the property was used in the course of racketeering activity in violation
of section 895.05(2)(a) of the Act." The trial court held that the home-
stead exemption in Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution did
not protect Caggiano's residence from RICO forfeiture, relying on
DeRuyter v. Florida.45 On appeal, Florida's Second District Court of
Appeal reversed, holding that the homestead exemption did protect Cag-
giano's residence.46 Noting conflict with the Fifth District Court of
Appeal, the Second District certified the issue to the Florida Supreme
Court.47
In an opinion by Chief Justice Barkett, the court stated that the
words and terms of the Florida Constitution are to be interpreted in light
of their natural and popular meaning as understood by the people who
have adopted them.48 The court then stated that the homestead exemp-
tion's usual liberal construction was particularly appropriate in the con-
text of civil forfeiture, a practice "historically disfavored in law and
38. 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
39. Id. at 61.
40. Id. at 57; see FLA. STAT. ch. 895 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
41. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57; FLA. STAT. ch. 849 (1983 & Supp. 1984).
42. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57.
43. Chapter 895.05(2)(a), FLA. STAT. (1989), reads: "All property, real or personal, including
money, used in the course of, intended for use in the course of, derived from, or realized through
conduct in violation of a provision of ss. 895.01-895.05 is subject to civil forfeiture to the state."
Chapter 895.02(9), FLA. STAT. (1989), defines "real property" as: "any real property or any
interest in such real property, including, but not limited to, any lease of or mortgage upon such
real property."
44. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57.
45. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d at 57 (citing DeRuyter v. Florida, 521 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA
1988)).
46. Id. at 57.
47. Id. at 57-58.
48. Id. at 58 (citing City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 489-90 (1933)).
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equity."'49 Accordingly, the court held that the word "sale" as used in
Article X, Section 4, was intended to be interpreted in its broad, non-
technical sense.50 "[I]t appears that the homestead exemption uses
broad, nonlegal terminology that was intended simply to guarantee that
the homestead would be preserved against any involuntary divestiture by
the courts, without regard to the technicalities of how that divestiture
would be accomplished. '51
In this interpretation, the court was guided by the Iowa Supreme
Court's holding in In re Property Seized from Bly.52 In that case, police
acting on a valid search warrant found, in the home of John Joseph Bly
and Judy Ann Bly, numerous items indicating drug trafficking, including
cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and assorted drug parapherna-
lia.3 Six days later, the State served and filed notice of forfeiture of the
Bly's home, on the ground that the property was used in violation of
Iowa Code section 809.1(2)(b). 54 The Blys filed an application for
return of their home on the ground, inter alia, that homestead property is
exempt from forfeiture. 55 Although the forfeiture statute makes no dis-
tinction between real and personal property, the court noted that Iowa
Code section 561.16 exempts homestead property from forced "judicial
sale where there is no special declaration of statute to the contrary. 5 6
The court stated that homestead statutes are to be liberally and broadly
construed in light of the policy considerations "not only 'for the benefit
of the family, but for the public welfare and social benefit which accrues
to the state by having families secure in their homes.' -5 Thus, the
court held that the term "judicial sale" as used in the exemption was
intended to include "any judicially compelled disposition of the home-
stead, whether denominated a 'sale' or not."'15  The Iowa court noted that
no other jurisdiction had yet considered whether a homestead may be
forfeited under a statute providing for forfeiture of real property. 9
The Florida Supreme Court was persuaded by this reasoning and
noted that, in Florida, this argument was even more persuasive because
49. Id. at 58.
50. Id. at 59.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 59 (citing In re Property Seized from Bly, 456 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1990)).
53. In re Bly, 456 N.W.2d at 196.
54. Id. Iowa Code section 809.1(2)(b) defines "[florfeitable property" as: "Property which
has been used or is intended to be used to facilitate the commission of a criminal offense or to
avoid detection or apprehension of a person committing a criminal offense."
55. In re Bly, 456 N.W.2d at 196.
56. Id. at 197, 198.
57. Id. at 199 (quoting In re Estate of McClain, 262 N.W. 666, 669 (Iowa 1935)).
58. Id. at 199.
59. Id. at 197 n.4.
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the exemption was a constitutional right rather than a mere statutory
exemption.' The court found that Article X, Section 4 provided for
three exceptions to the exemption (regarding tax liens and certain statu-
tory liens) and that forfeiture was not one of them.61 Thus, the court
concluded:
in light of the historical prejudice against forfeiture, the constitutional
sanctity of the home, and the rules of construction requiring a liberal,
nontechnical interpretation of the homestead exemption and a strict
construction of the exceptions to that exemption, we hold that article
X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution prohibits civil or criminal
forfeiture of homestead property.62
Justice Grimes, in dissent, argued that the court had incorrectly
applied the homestead exemption beyond its original scope of protecting
families against economic misfortune. 63 He asserted that the purpose of
the homestead exemption was to protect the family home from forced
sale to repay the debts of the owner, and that the court has not applied
the exemption to protect homestead property from forced sale arising out
of fraud.61 Justice Grimes noted the policy against allowing the property
owner to use the exemption to protect his home when he was guilty of
fraud and argued that similar policy concerns weigh in favor of denying
such protection in cases arising out of criminal conduct.65 "While the
majority refers to the 'historical prejudice against forfeiture,'" he
responded, "there is an even greater historical prejudice against
" 66crime.
The Florida Supreme Court compared the policy against the disfa-
vored practice of forfeiture, based upon the sanctity of the home, with
the interests of crime control. Forfeiture doctrine forces just this sort of
balancing act. The fictions involved in portraying forfeiture as an action
against the property inevitably focus forfeiture debates on the property
rights of the owner. The thinly disguised crime control purpose of for-
feiture actions only serves to heighten the constitutional considerations
regarding the property owner's due process rights. These conflicting
considerations were finally addressed by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.67
60. Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56, 59-60 (Fla. 1992).
61. Id. at 60.
62. Id. at 61.
63. Id. at 61 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (quoting Tullis v. Tullis, 360 So. 2d 375, 377 (Fla. 1978)).
65. Id. at 61.
66. Id. at 62.
67. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
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B. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property
On January 31, 1985, police executed a search warrant at the home
of James Daniel Good and discovered 89 lbs. of marijuana, marijuana
seeds, vials containing hashish oil, and drug paraphernalia.6" Good
pleaded guilty to promoting a harmful drug in violation of Section 712-
1245(1)(b) of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.69 He was sentenced to one
year in jail, five years of probation, was fined $1000, and was required
to forfeit to the State $3187 in cash found at the premises.7 °
On August 8, 1989, the United States filed an in rem forfeiture
action in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii
against Good's house and the surrounding four-acre parcel of land on
which the house was situated.71  This action was brought under 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) 72 on the ground that the property had been used to
commit or facilitate the commission of a federal drug offense.73 At an
ex parte hearing held on August 18, 1989, a United States magistrate
found that the Government had established probable cause to believe
that Good's property was subject to forfeiture under § 881(a)(7), based
on Good's drug conviction and the evidence discovered during the 1985
search of Good's home.74 On August 21, 1989, the Government seized
the property without prior notice to Good or an adversary hearing. 7
Good filed a claim for the property and an answer to the Government's
complaint, alleging, inter alia, that the seizure deprived him of his prop-
erty without due process of law.76 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit unanimously held that the seizure of Good's prop-
erty without prior notice and a hearing violated the Due Process Clause
68. Id. at 497.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 21 U.S.C. See. 881(a)(7) provides:
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no
property right shall exist in them:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any
leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances
or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter
punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no property shall
be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of an owner, by
reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
73. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 497.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 498.
76. Id.
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of the Fifth Amendment." The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits regarding the constitu-
tional question of "whether, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the Government
in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real property without first afford-
ing the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard. '7 8 In an opinion by
Justice Kennedy, the Court ruled that it did. 9
The Government argued that, in forfeiture cases, the Fourth
Amendment defines the scope of due process.80 This argument, ironi-
cally, is based on the characterization of civil forfeiture as serving a
"'law enforcement purpos[e].' "81 Where this admission is when the
action's basic fiction is employed is anyone's guess. The Court rejected
the idea that one constitutional amendment could control this question to
the exclusion of all other amendments. 82
The Court distinguished Gerstein v. Pugh,8 3 on which the Govern-
ment relied, by stating that Gerstein concerned the arrest and detention
of criminal suspects, for which the Fourth Amendment was explicitly
tailored, and that the protections afforded a suspect during arrest and
initial detention are "only the first stage of an elaborate system" in
which the suspect is afforded many safeguards.8 4 Accordingly, the
Court held that such a rule was not appropriate in the civil forfeiture
context and instead applied the three-part test found in Mathews v.
Eldridge.85 The Court reasoned that where, as here, the Government
seizes property "not to preserve evidence of wrongdoing, but to assert
ownership and control over the property itself," the Government must
comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or the
Fourteenth Amendment in the case of seizure by a state.8 6
Explaining why the Court's approval of the ex parte seizure prac-
tice upheld in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.8 7 was not
dispositive of this case, the Court stated that a distinction must be made
77. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 498. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution reads in relevant part: "No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... The Ninth Circuit's decision is reported as United States v.
James Daniel Good Real Property, 971 F.2d 1376, 1384 (9th Cir. 1992).
78. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 497, 498.
79. Id. at 505.
80. Id. at 499.
81. Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 13).
82. Id.
83. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
84. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 499 (quoting Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125 n.27).
85. Id. at 501 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
86. Id. at 500.
87. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
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between real and personal property.88 Noting that the property at stake
in Calero-Toledo was personal property (a yacht), the Court explained
that "the fact that a yacht was the 'sort [of property] that could be
removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or concealed, if advance
warning of confiscation were given,' "was central to its analysis.8 9 Sec-
tion 881 (a)(7) of Title 21 was not amended to authorize forfeiture of real
property until ten years after the Calero-Toledo decision. 0
The Court stated that the central requirements of due process are
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard at a pre-seizure hearing. 9'
These requirements protect the individual and his property rights from
arbitrary government action.92 Only "extraordinary situations where
some valid governmental interest is at stake" justify the avoidance of the
pre-seizure adversarial hearing.93
The Court employed the three-part test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge to judge the interests at stake.94
The Mathews analysis requires us to consider the private interest
affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
that interest through the procedures used, as well as the probable
value of additional safeguards; and the Government's interest, includ-
ing the administrative burden that additional procedural requirements
would impose.95
Good had a substantial interest at stake. The Court declared that
"Good's right to maintain control over his home, and to be free from
governmental interference, is a private interest of historic and continuing
importance." 96 The Court considered the property forfeiture in this case
to affect significant personal interests.
The seizure of a home produces a far greater deprivation than the loss
of furniture, or even attachment. It gives the Government not only
the right to prohibit sale, but also the right to evict occupants, to
modify the property, to condition occupancy, to receive rents, and to
supersede the owner in all rights pertaining to the use, possession,
and enjoyment of the property.97
Thus, as to the first prong of the Mathews analysis, the Court found that
88. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 500.
89. Id. (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679) (alteration in original).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 500-01 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972)).
93. Id. at 501 (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 82 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
379 (1971))).
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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the private interests at stake weighed heavily in the balance.9"
As to the second prong of the Mathews test, the Court found that
the practice of ex parte seizure "creates an unacceptable risk of error."99
The Court discussed the scant protections given to the innocent owner,
noting that the government is not required to offer any evidence as to the
owner's guilt or possible defenses. 1° "And even if the ultimate judicial
decision is that the claimant was an innocent owner, or that the Govern-
ment lacked probable cause, this determination, coming months after the
seizure, 'would not cure the temporary deprivation that an earlier hear-
ing might have prevented.' "9101
Finally, addressing the third prong of the Mathews test, the Court
examined the government's interest to see whether some pressing need
for prompt action was called for in the context of civil forfeiture actions
against real property.102 Distinguishing Calero-Toledo, the Court found
no need for pre-hearing seizure of real property either to preserve juris-
diction over the res or to prevent loss of the res.103 The Court stated that
the legitimate government interests in forfeiture proceedings to prevent
sale, destruction, or further illegal use of the property can all be secured
without a pre-hearing seizure."°4
The Court explained that previous cases justified pre-hearing
seizures due to the exigent circumstances of war-time or the govern-
ment's need to collect tax revenues.10 5 These circumstances do not exist
in the context of real property forfeitures, and in light of the significant
property interest at stake, the Court found that "any harm that results
from delay is minimal in comparison to the injury occasioned by errone-
ous seizure." 10 6
The Court extended its requirement of a pre-seizure hearing to all
real property, not only to residences.10 7 Nevertheless, the Court noted
that in the context of residences, as in this case, an "essential principle"
is illustrated. 0 ' "Individual freedom finds tangible expression in prop-
erty rights. At stake in this and many other forfeiture cases are the
security and privacy of the home and those who take shelter within
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 502.
101. Id. (quoting Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 3 (1991)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 502-03.
104. Id. at 503.
105. Id. at 504.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 505.
108. Id.
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it."1
09
Chief Justice Rehnquist questioned the Court's holding considering
that no such pre-seizure hearing is required when a criminal defendant's
liberty is at stake." 0 He was satisfied with relying on the Fourth
Amendment to determine what process was due."' The Chief Justice
asserted that the strong interest in fighting the drug war was sufficient to
tip the balance in the Government's favor." 2
Justice O'Connor disputed the majority's holding on the ground
that she found no distinction between the interest at stake in real prop-
erty as opposed to personal property." 3 Although recognizing a signifi-
cant property interest was at stake, O'Connor argued that the "sanctity of
the home" was embodied in the home owner's privacy and possessory
interests and was as such addressed by the Fourth Amendment.'
Where the issue is instead deprivation of property interests, the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment controls, she asserted, and in the
context of the Due Process Clause there ought to be no difference
between real and personal property." 5
Justice Thomas agreed with the Court's desire to protect real prop-
erty rights and the Court's distrust of the Government's "aggressive use
of broad civil forfeiture statutes," but was unable to agree that Good was
deprived of due process in this case." I6 Thomas, in fact, made an impas-
sioned defense of real property rights and the danger posed by civil for-
feiture statutes. He stated that the Court "has not always placed
sufficient stress upon the protection of individuals' traditional rights in
real property."'"7 Sympathizing with the Court's focus on real property
rights, rights which he called "central to our heritage," Thomas referred
to passages in the past cases of Payton v. New York, " '[R]espect for the
sanctity of the home ... has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic," and Entick v. Carrington, " 'The great end, for
which men entered into society, was to secure their property.' $118
Justice Thomas then questioned the justifications behind civil for-
feiture, saying that he was disturbed by its breadth.' 9 He stated, "it is
109. Id.
110. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
11. Id. at 509.
112. Id. at 510.
113. Id. at 511 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
114. Id. at 513.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980), and Entick, 19 How. St. Tv. 1029, 1066
(C.P. 1765)).
119. Id.
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unclear whether the central theory behind in rem forfeiture, the fiction
'that the thing is primarily considered the offender,' can fully justify the
immense scope of § 881(a)(7)."' 20 In fact, Thomas suggested that in an
appropriate case it may be necessary for the Court to reevaluate its "gen-
erally deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area of civil
forfeiture. 1 21 Nevertheless, Thomas argued that this was not an appro-
priate case, because Good was not in fact an innocent owner as he had
already been convicted of drug offenses involving the property. 122
In Good Real Property, the Court recognized the fundamental
nature of real property rights, particularly in one's home. Significantly,
this recognition was not based on any positively enacted homestead
exemption. The only textual reference to the sanctity of the home, or
any real property right, was the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Yet, as Justice Thomas's opinion suggests,
the fundamental sanctity of the home owes as much to the traditions and
purposes of society as it does to any textual reference. 123 Section V of
this Comment will address the possible scope of this, perhaps, natural
right in homestead property and its effect on civil forfeiture in light of
cases such as Caggiano, Good Real Property, and Austin.
C. Austin v. United States
In Austin v. United States,24 the Supreme Court held that the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 125 applies to forfeit-
ures of property under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7). 126
After being convicted of one count of possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute and sentenced by a state court to seven years' impris-
onment, Richard Lyle Austin then faced an in rem action in the United
States district court brought by the United States seeking forfeiture of
his home and auto body shop under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and
(a)(7). 127 In support of its action, the government offered the affidavit of
Sioux Falls Police Officer Donald Satterlee which stated that Austin had
met with a man at the body shop, and that Austin agreed to sell the man
cocaine."' Austin then went to his home to obtain the drugs and
120. Id. (citation omitted).
121. Id. Thomas suggested that Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), discussed
below, may be such an appropriate case. Id. at 515 n.2.
122. Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. at 516 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting).
123. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
124. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
125. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
126. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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returned to the shop to complete the sale.1 29 A search of the home and
shop, pursuant to a warrant, uncovered small amounts of marijuana, a
small gun, drug paraphernalia, and some cash.130 Austin defended
against the civil forfeiture action on the grounds that it violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 3
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, traced the purposes of the
Eighth Amendment. He stated that "the Eighth Amendment and § 10 of
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, from which it derives, were intended
to prevent the government from abusing its power to punish."' 32 The
issue then became "not, as the United States would have it, whether
forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is civil or criminal, but rather
whether it is punishment."' 3 3 The Court employed a test which was
based on the idea that" 'a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also
serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term.' ",134
In examining the theories underlying civil forfeiture, the Court
stated that concepts of the property's guilt rest upon a belief in the
owner's misuse of the property or negligence in allowing the property to
be misused.' This is illustrated, the Court noted, by the fact that if
forfeiture was not intended to punish the owner there would be no need
for the innocent owner defense. 136 Thus, the Court concluded that in
rem forfeiture was, at least in part, punishment. 37 The punitive nature
of forfeiture under § 881 was confirmed in the Court's eyes by the legis-
lative history tying forfeiture to the commission of drug offenses.138
Because civil forfeiture is punishment, the Court held that it could
be limited by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.' 39
Significantly, the Court declined to fashion a test to determine when
civil forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment, instead leaving that for
the lower courts to consider.' 40
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which hc offered a
standard by which to weigh the proportional punishment of the forfei-
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2804.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2806.
134. Id. at 2806 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
135. Id. at 2808.
136. Id. at 2809.
137. Id. at 2810.
138. Id. at 2811.
139. Id. at 2812.
140. Id.
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ture. "The question," according to Scalia, "is not how much the confis-
cated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close
enough relationship to the offense." 141 Scalia argued that the monetary
value of the seized property was not important; he illustrated the point
by explaining that scales used to measure illegal drugs would be seized
whether made of gold or base metals.
142
Scalia's discussion of the extent of the taint of unlawful use is con-
sistent with past civil forfeiture doctrine; 143 however, it fails to address
the difference between real and personal property. While he is correct
the that monetary value of the property is not the issue, the nature of the
property and the claimant's interest in it may be. To illustrate the point,
whether the property is a mansion or a simple family house may not be
relevant, but whether the property is expensive chemical manufacturing
equipment or equally valuable homestead property may be. The effect
of recent homestead property decisions on state civil forfeiture actions as
well as attempts to use state homestead exemptions as a defense against
federal civil forfeiture will be discussed in the next section.
IV. WHERE THE LAW STANDS
A. State Homestead Exemptions as a Defense to State Civil
Forfeiture
Florida followed Iowa in holding that its homestead exemption pre-
cluded civil forfeiture of homestead property.'" Several other states
have also considered whether their homestead provisions similarly limit
civil forfeiture, but the results are mixed.
In recent years, although before Caggiano, both Arizona and Colo-
rado courts held that their respective homestead exemptions did not pre-
clude civil forfeiture of homestead property. In Colorado v. Allen,'45 a
Colorado appeals court examined Colorado's statutory homestead
exemption. It held that the law only protected homestead property from
seizure " 'arising from any debt, contract, or civil obligation.' "46 In
that case, the claimant's home had already been declared a public nui-
sance because of its use in criminal activity. 147 Because the forfeiture
141. Id. at 2812, 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 2815.
143. See id. Such a discussion is typical of the legal fiction regarding the property's guilt. See
supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying note 52.
145. 767 P.2d 798 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
146. Id. at 800 (quoting CoLo. REv. STAT. § 38-41-201 (1982)).
147. Id. This characterization of the action against the premises seems to correspond with the
federal concept of civil forfeiture as an in rem action against a guilty property. See supra text
accompanying notes 11-15.
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did not arise from a debt obligation, the court held that the exemption
did not apply. 148
An Arizona court of appeals considered the question in In re 1632
North Santa Rita.149 Also considering a statutory homestead exemption,
the court stated that the policy behind the Arizona exemption was lim-
ited to protecting the family from forfeitures arising from debts incurred
by the owner, despite the fact that the statute contained no such lan-
guage.150 The court reasoned that to use the exemption to protect prop-
erty from forfeiture due to the illegal uses to which the property was put
would violate the policies behind the exemption.'
In addition to Florida and Iowa, two states have recently held that
their homestead exemptions do protect homestead property from civil
forfeiture. In Oklahoma ex rel. McCoy v. 1844 Burnt Oak Drive,"2 an
Oklahoma court of appeals adopted the reasoning of In re Bly, and held
that because its statutory exemption contained no language limiting it to
seizure arising from debts, it protected the claimants homestead property
from civil forfeiture arising from that property's use in the commission
of a crime. 153
In Kansas ex rel. Braun v. 918 North County Line Road,154 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that its constitutional homestead exemp-
tion did protect homestead property from civil forfeiture. The court rea-
soned that because civil forfeiture was not one of the specific exceptions
to the homestead exemption, it was not immune from the exemption's
protections. 155 This holding was predicated in large part on Kansas's
policy of "zealously" protecting homestead property rights.
156
One explanation for the split among the states is that courts have
not protected homesteads from civil forfeiture when the homestead
exemptions are merely statutory or expressly limited to debt situations,
while courts have protected homesteads from civil forfeiture when the
exemptions are constitutional or not expressly limited to debt situa-
tions.' 5 7 Thus, when the exemption is worded to indicate a broad policy
consideration in favor of the importance of the home, or when the
importance of the homestead interest is emphasized by its inclusion in a
148. Allen, 767 P.2d at 800.
149. 801 P.2d 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
150. Id. at 437.
151. Id.
152. 831 P.2d 1008 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id. at 1010; see supra text accompanying note 58.
154. 840 P.2d 453 (Kan. 1992).
155. Id. at 455.
156. Id.
157. See Eustace, supra note 28, at 1129.
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state's constitution, courts seem willing to use the exemption to protect
homestead property from state civil forfeiture.
B. State Homestead Exemptions as a Defense to Federal Civil
Forfeiture
Once the state courts determined that state homestead exemptions
protect homestead property from state civil forfeiture, it became neces-
sary to determine what effect these state homestead exemptions have on
federal civil forfeiture. To date, only the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
have addressed the issue, and each has ruled that federal civil forfeiture
statutes preempt state homestead exemptions.1 58
In United States v. 1606 Butterfield Road,1 59 a case arising out of
the same circumstances as In re Bly,160 the Bly's tried to argue that the
state homestead exemption blocked federal civil forfeiture as it did state
civil forfeiture. 61 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Iowa rejected this defense, finding that the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution requires that federal law applies when-
ever a conflict between state and federal law exists.162 The only way to
apply the state and federal statutes consistently, the court stated, was to
apply the state homestead exemption only to state civil forfeiture pro-
ceedings.' 63 Although property interests are defined by the states, the
court reasoned, "[t]he issue is whether the property interest is subject to
forfeiture and not whether a property interest exists." 6 Thus, the court
held that 21 U.S.C. § 881, as written by Congress, applies to all prop-
erty; therefore, the state homestead exemption does not preclude federal
forfeiture.1 65
In a case arising out of Iowa, the Eighth Circuit addressed the ques-
tion of preemption in United States v. Curtis.1 66 The court held that a
uniform application of the federal statute required that the federal law
preempt Iowa's homestead exemption.1 67
In a case before the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, property owners raised Florida's homestead exemp-
158. See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498 (1lth Cir. 1994); United
States v. Curtis, 965 F.2d 610, 616 (8th Cir. 1992).
159. 786 F. Supp. 1497 (N.D. Iowa 1991).
160. 456 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1990) (holding that Iowa's homestead exemption precluded
forfeiture of the Bly's homestead property under a state civil forfeiture statute).
161. 1606 Butterfield Rd., 786 F. Supp. at 1503.
162. Id. at 1504 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1505.
165. See id.
166. 965 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1992).
167. Id. at 616.
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tion as a defense to federal civil forfeiture. 68 The court found that
although state law defines the interests of the owner, and federal law
protects the interests of an innocent owner, there was no basis for hold-
ing that federal law protected homestead property.169 In fact, the court
held that prohibiting the forfeiture of homestead property would violate
the intent of Congress; thus, the federal law preempted the contrary state
homestead exemption.' 70
In United States v. 18755 North Bay Road,17 1 the Eleventh Circuit
addressed many of the issues that have been discussed in this Comment.
This in rem civil forfeiture action was initiated by the Government
against the single family residence of Emilio and Yolanda Delio after a
search pursuant to warrant uncovered gambling records, poker tables,
poker chips, decks of cards, and cash.' 72 The evidence of gambling,
consisting of a Wednesday night poker game, resulted in Emilio's con-
viction for conducting an illegal gambling operation. 17  Yolanda was
not a party to the criminal case.' 74
Addressing the Delios' defense regarding Florida's homestead
exemption, the court noted that "state constitutional provisions cannot
obstruct the uniform national enforcement of federal criminal statutes or
those federal forfeiture laws intended to have uniform application
throughout the nation."'17 The Delios argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1955,
pursuant to which the Government sought forfeiture, defined its applica-
tion by incorporating state gambling laws; therefore, the state homestead
exemption should be incorporated as a limit to the possible penalties for
violating the statute. 176 The court disagreed and held that the federal
statute borrowed state law only to the extent of defining the illegal activ-
ity, and that there was no indication that Congress intended to incorpo-
rate state law as a limit to forfeiture.177 Because the statute served a
national purpose (fighting illegal gambling), the federal law preempted
the state homestead exemption.
Thus far, the federal courts have not accepted a state homestead
exemption as a defense to a federal civil forfeiture action. These hold-
168. United States v. 212 Airport Rd. S., 771 F. Supp. 1214, 1215 (1991).
169. Id. at 1215-16.
170. Id. at 1216.
171. 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994).
172. Id. at 1494.
173. Id. at 1495.
174. Id. Yolanda's separate innocent owner defense raised important issues regarding
collateral estoppel and tenancy by the entireties. Id. at 1496-98. Although these issues are
unfortunately beyond the scope of this Comment, they certainly merit further discussion.
175. Id. at 1497.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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ings were all based on preemption doctrine; and on that issue, those
claiming the application of a state homestead exemption against a fed-
eral statute will certainly fail. A better defense to federal civil forfeiture
might be that the fundamental sanctity of the home raises the stakes for
any proportionality determination under Austin.
C. Excessive Fines Analyses After Austin
Although there is still no consensus among the lower courts as to
the appropriate test for civil forfeiture challenges based upon the Eighth
Amendment, there is some indication that Justice Scalia's "substantial
relation" test 7 8 is gaining acceptance. 7 9 Only the Fourth Circuit has
enunciated a clear statement of its test, what it calls an "instrumentality
test."
In United States v. Chandler, 80 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether the civil forfei-
ture of a 33 acre farm due to its involvement in drug transactions consti-
tuted an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Austin.' Before the trial court, the Gov-
ernment had introduced evidence that the property owner's employees
had been paid in quantities of illegal narcotics for their work on the
property. 82 Further, witnesses testified to seeing multiple drug transac-
tions consummated in the kitchen, garage, and basement of the farm
house. 8 3
Noting the ambiguity of the previous approaches to Eighth Amend-
ment analysis, '8 the Fourth Circuit announced a clear three-part test that
measures: "(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the
extent of the property's role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability of
the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating offending property that
can readily be separated from the remainder."' 8 5
178. See supra text accompanying note 141.
179. See United States v. 2408 Parliament, 859 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Mich. 1994); United States
v. Shelly's Riverside Hgts., Lot X, 859 F. Supp. 150 (M.D. Pa. 1994); United States v. 2828 N.
54th St., 829 F. Supp. 1071, 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1993). Nonetheless, there has not been complete
agreement amongst the lower courts. For example, the Northern District of New York has refused
to follow Justice Scalia's approach. United States v. 835 Seventh St., 832 F. Supp. 43, 48
(N.D.N.Y. 1993). See also United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231 (8th Cir. 1994), in which the
Eighth Circuit offered a version of Justice Scalia's substantial relation test in which other factors
such as the quantum of property forfeited and the owner's monetary interest in the criminal
enterprise are taken into account. Id. at 1236 n.2, 1236-37.
180. No. 93-2064, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 27049 (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 1994).
181. Id. at *1.
182. Id. at *4.
183. Id. at *4-5.
184. See id. at *11-12.
185. Id. at *18-19.
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In applying this test, the Fourth Circuit stated that a court should
examine the role the property played in the offense, i.e. its instrumental-
ity.18 6 In the case at issue, the court noted that the farm house had
served as the site of over 130 drug transactions, and that the secluded
location of the property was vital to the drug activity.'8 7 Further, the
drug activity occurred throughout the house, and the property itself was
maintained with payments made in drugs.' Because the property
owner was directly involved in these transactions, and he had failed to
offer evidence as to how tainted portions of the property could be distin-
guished or separated from untainted portions, 8 9 the court held that for-
feiture of the entire 33 acre property did not violate the Excessive Fines
Clause.' 90 It seems that by focusing on the relationship of the property
to the offense, the Fourth Circuit has embraced Justice Scalia's substan-
tial relation test.
In a concurring opinion, Circuit Judge Wilkinson asserted that the
announced test was appropriate because it bore a close relation to the
type of analysis employed in the underlying forfeiture proceeding. 19'
Once the culpability of the property is established below, he argued, the
appeals court would have little difficulty finding that the three-part test
was met.' 
92
The troubling aspect of Justice Scalia's approach, though, is its
seeming reliance on the personification fiction. How can a piece of
property be said to bear a substantial relation to the crime? If, for exam-
ple, a property owner uses the garage attached to his house as a storage
site for illegal drugs, one could say that the house was substantially
related to the crime and therefore subject to forfeiture. However, despite
this characterization, would it not be more realistic to state that the
owner had used the house in an illegal manner and thus must, according
to forfeiture doctrine, lose his rights in the house? This articulation of
the theory illustrates the truly punitive nature of civil forfeiture, which
implicated the Eighth Amendment question in the first place. Justice
186. Id. at *16-17.
187. Id. at *23.
188. Id. at *23-24.
189. One must wonder how the court would employ this aspect of'the test in other
circumstances. For instance, how could this prong be applied logically in a case where drug
activity was confined to a single room in a vast estate? It seems that this part of the test relies on
quirks of architecture rather than on a more careful examination of the property interests at stake.
190. Chandler, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 27049.
191. Id. at *30 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
192. Id. at *32. What seems to Judge Wilkinson to be the tests's strength, might also be
considered a fatal flaw. The Supreme Court's decision in Austin seemed to call for a more careful
and distinct analysis of the scope of the forfeiture, once the rightness of the forfeiture order itself
was settled. Judge Wilkinson seems content to let almost any decision by a trial court stand, once
the initial forfeiture decision is validated.
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Scalia's test, it seems, is neither as clear cut, nor as removed from the
increasingly discredited forfeiture fiction, as one would hope. A better
approach may be to address the various interests at stake directly with-
out resorting to fictions.
V. THE SANCTITY OF THE HOME AS A FACTOR IN PROPORTIONALITY
A recognition of the fundamental importance of the individual's
property right in the home should provide courts, already distrustful of
the government's use of civil forfeiture, with a doctrinal approach to halt
the government's excesses. Courts have clearly begun to question the
wisdom and legality of civil forfeiture.' 93 The danger to homestead
property rights is equally clear. Joseph A. Eustace Jr., in analyzing pos-
sible responses to the Caggiano decision, stated that any attempt to limit
the application of homestead exemptions "would substantially erode the
security in one's home which is the cornerstone of the homestead
exemption's purpose."' 94 The answer is for courts, already leery of civil
forfeiture, to use the renewed recognition of the sacred homestead prop-
erty right to block overzealous prosecutors' use of civil forfeiture on
both a state and federal level.
A problem may arise from the lack of uniformity among state and
federal enactments regarding homestead protections. This problem is
solved if one accepts that the sacred homestead property right is not a
creature of any positive law, but rather is inherent, either in common law
history and tradition or in natural law. Such a recognition should not be
considered too controversial. Consider the language of the Supreme
Court in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property.95 "Indi-
vidual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights. At stake in
this and many other forfeiture cases are the security and the privacy of
193. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 515 n.1
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting the Second Circuit as being
"'enormously troubled by the government's increasing and virtually unchecked use of civil
forfeiture,' "United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc. 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d Cir.
1992), and citing an Eighth Circuit opinion questioning the breadth of the government's seizure
powers, United States v. One Parcel of Property, 964 F.2d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 1992)); see also
United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass'n Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289, 1298 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Cudahy, J., concurring) (stating that a broad construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 "if seriously
espoused-could raise significant constitutional questions"); Eustace, supra note 28, at 1131 (He
states that "[e]xperience has shown that law enforcement officials have zealously pursued
forfeiture at almost every available opportunity." Eustace further offered his personal
observations from his tenure as a federal prosecutor when he saw "pre-indictment and conviction
seizures of homesteads with only slight connections to criminal activity, and.., the threat of
homestead forfeiture used as a bargaining chip with defendants and witnesses alike.").
194. Eustace, supra note 28, at 1131.
195. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
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the home and those who take shelter within it."' 96 Consider, too, Justice
Thomas's separate opinion in which he referred to property rights as
"central to our heritage," and the sanctity of the home as "embedded in
our traditions since the origins of the Republic." 97 The fundamental
importance of homestead property rights was not born full grown out of
the heads of the Florida legislators. It stems from the deeper philosophy
and traditions of individual freedom. The sanctity of the home, there-
fore, should be taken into account by courts at all levels and in all juris-
dictions whether or not there is an applicable homestead exemption
provision.
Positive enactments of homestead exemptions, as in Florida, must
be seen as legislative attempts to recognize and accommodate the inher-
ent sanctity of the home. Such enactments should be given full effect by
the courts of the jurisdiction. Thus, the Florida Constitution, for exam-
ple, precludes all state civil forfeiture. Though the fundamental home-
stead property right exists with or without the provisions of Article X,
Section 4 of the Florida Constitution, its inclusion therein reinforces the
power of Florida courts to prohibit all attempts at civil forfeiture under
state statutes.
What then to do with forfeiture actions in states without a constitu-
tional or broad-based statutory homestead exemption, or in civil forfei-
ture actions by the federal government? In those cases, the inherent
homestead property right must be asserted. The courts on all levels
should give this fundamental property interest heavy weight in future
proportionality determinations. Instead of applying Justice Scalia's sub-
stantial relation test, courts ought to balance the government's interest in
stripping an alleged wrong-doer of his unlawfully employed property
against the property owner's strong property interest in his home. This
test would force the government to establish the property owner's mis-
use of the property and to establish a crime control purpose sufficient to
overcome the owner's inherent rights in his home. In contrast to
Scalia's test in which the only factor is the extent to which the property
was used in the crime, this proposed test requires the courts to factor in
the enormity of the alleged crime and the property interest at stake. It
may seem that this test gives greater protection to the property than is
afforded to the property owner if he were facing criminal sentencing.
While it is true that a person convicted of a drug offense may face stiff
penalties even for small amounts of drugs, a criminal defendant is enti-
tled to far greater protection than is a piece of property subjected to
196. Id. at 505.
197. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
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forfeiture proceedings. 9 '
The Eleventh Circuit, in the case of Yolanda and Emilio Delio,
reached a similar holding when examining the proportionality question
raised by Austin.1 99 The court stated:
[e]xamining this case through the lens of Austin, and accepting the
fact that Emilio Delio used his home for a gambling operation in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, we conclude, under the particular facts
of this case, that the forfeiture of his home, of an arguable value of
$150,000.00, is an imposition of a disproportionate penalty.2°°
For the court to have held otherwise would have violated the spirit
and language of the Eighth Amendment as characterized by the Supreme
Court in Austin.2°0 Such a holding could not be based on Florida's
homestead exemption; that provision is preempted by federal law.
Rather, the ruling should be viewed in light of the fundamental impor-
tance of homestead property rights in this country.
Contrast this result with the facts of United States v. Chandler.20 2
Under the analysis proposed in this Comment, the government's interest
in curtailing large scale and continuing drug transactions and in prevent-
ing a property owner from maintaining and securing his property
through the drug trade would easily outweigh the property owner's inter-
est in the homestead property. The owner's interest would be dimin-
ished by his activity and its connection to the property.
The balancing test proposed in this Comment, in which homestead
rights are given special weight, could help the courts reign in overzeal-
ous attempts by the government to use civil forfeiture in its war on
crime, and yet preserve civil forfeiture as a tool to combat crime when
the interests at stake legitimately call for the seizure.
VI. CONCLUSION
The government's war on drugs and crime is important and should
be fought with diligence. Efforts on this behalf, however, must not lead
the government into sacrificing the bedrock rights and freedoms inherent
in the society it is trying to protect. When the government wishes to
seize property allegedly employed by its owners in illegal ventures, the
government must take care to follow the procedural and philosophical
safeguards required by this country's laws, Constitution, and ideals. So
198. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
199. See United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir. 1994).
200. Id.
201. Supra text accompanying notes 132-134.
202. No. 93-2064, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 27049 (4th Cir. Sept. 27, 1994); see supra notes
180-92 and accompanying text.
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long as the government may seize a person's home on mere probable
cause, no one's home is a castle. The government must fight its wars
without arbitrarily pillaging the people in whose name it acts. Now that
civil forfeiture is beginning to be put in its proper place by the courts, it
is time for the sanctity of the homestead property right to be recognized
and addressed. Austin gives the courts this opportunity, and it must be
heeded.
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